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ABSTRACT
SPECIFYING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
IMPROVEMENT FOR IEEE STANDARD 830
Jacob D. McCarty
This paper presents a concept on how the software requirements
specifications template provided by IEEE Standard 830 could be updated
to ensure that security is analyzed during the early stages of the software
development lifecycle. This improved security requirement in the
software requirements specifications will ensure that software developers
will have a more clear understanding of how to protect digital information.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Professionals in the field of software engineering have taken many steps to
enhance the design of software to ensure secure information.

Security has

traditionally been an afterthought of the computer software design process [16].
Current standards recommend that security be evaluated in the software
requirements specifications. “It is not that developers are incapable of producing
[secure] software … it is just that they are not sufficiently motivated to do so”
[15].

Developers generally do not understand the security requirements of

software systems that they are designing; therefore, such security requirements
are either ignored or not adequately fulfilled.
This paper presents a discussion of current software practices of developing the
software requirements specifications. This document begins by presenting a brief
background of software engineering processes and the phases in which software
requirements specifications are developed.

Next it presents the Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers, IEEE, standard for software requirements
specifications. Third it presents examples of current legislation and regulations
surrounding the use of sensitive information. Finally, a possible solution on how
to further define security in the software requirements specifications is presented.

1.1 Statement of the Problem
Current practices for developing software requirements specifications appear to
be inadequate. The current software requirements specifications standard does
not provide a clear description on how to specify security requirements. This
document provides a detailed method for improving the IEEE standard regarding
security.

The present IEEE Standard 830 places security information in the

software attributes section and does not provide a clear description of how to
specify security requirements. This thesis will provide a suggested outline for
developing software requirements specifications with improved security visibility.
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2 BACKGROUND
Software engineering can be described as a process in which a computer program
and its supporting documentation are developed.

There are many types of

software process models that are used to manage how a software product is
developed. According to Ian Sommerville, “Most software process models are
based on one of three general models or paradigms of software development”
[11]. The three general models are: the waterfall approach, iterative development,
and component-based.

2.1 The Software Process
All of the software models produce many different types of documentation to
describe the software being developed.

These documentation sets serve as

contracts between the users of the system, the client asking for the product being
developed, and the software development team. After development is completed,
testing of the software begins, based on the development documentation, to
ensure that all aspects of the software were developed to the software
requirements specifications.

This paper will describe the IEEE standard to

developing software requirements specifications and make recommendations to
update the standard to meet the needs of organizations developing software. This
paper will explain the different models and techniques to developing software and
point out the specific location in which software requirements specifications are
created.
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In 1968 and 1969, software engineering became the official practice for
developing computer software architectures and designs during two NATO
Software Engineering Conferences [10].

During these conferences, software

engineering was compared to computer science and practitioners of both
disciplines discussed how they could work together to develop better software
products. The discussion was completed by a group comprised of academic and
industry professionals. These conferences set the concept of computer software
development being a set of phases: conception, design, implementation, testing,
and maintenance [10]. Software models take a different approach to completing
these phases, but every model discussed hereafter contains the concepts of the
phases put forward at the conference.
In the forthcoming sections there is a brief description of three different software
lifecycle models. Note that in each of the descriptions there is a specific notation
stating which phase or phases the software requirements specifications are
developed.

3

2.1.1 The Waterfall Model
The waterfall model, created by W. W. Royce in 1970, is a set of
incremental steps.

Each step is considered a phase in which its

predecessor must be completed prior to moving forward in the
development process. This lifecycle model includes the following phases,
listed in order: requirement definition, system and software design,
implementation and unit testing, integration and system testing, and
operation and maintenance. The waterfall model provides a means by
which developers can reevaluate a previous phase.

If a problem is

discovered, the development team suspends the current phase and reenters
the previous phase to correct problems prior to moving forward with
development. Due to the specific set of phases and how they are to be
completed, the waterfall model is typically not a good model for use in
software design where the system requirements are not well understood or
are expected to rapidly change throughout the process.

During the

development of the waterfall model, security was not an issue that needed
to be highlighted; therefore, it was left out of the model for analysis. The
software requirements specifications is completed in the second phase of
the waterfall model [11]. Figure 1 displays a graphical representation of
the waterfall model.
Requirements
Definition

Software
requirements
specifications are
developed here.
System and
Software Design

Implementation
and Unit Testing

Integration and
System Testing

Operation and
Maintenance

Figure 1: The Waterfall Model [11]
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2.1.2 The Spiral Model
The spiral model, created by B. W. Boehm in 1988, is represented as a
series of spirals. The software process begins in the innermost spirals and
work outward. Each iteration of the spiral focuses on a different aspect of
the software being developed. The spiral model analyzes each cycle in
four ways: objective setting, risk assessment and reduction, development
and validation, and planning. The main focus of the spiral model is risk; if
risk is determined to be too high, then the project is ended and not
completed.

During the risk assessment a security analysis should be

completed, if the security risk is too high then the project would be ended.
The software requirements specifications are completed in one cycle of the
spiral [11]. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the spiral
model.

Figure 2: The Spiral Model [11]
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2.1.3 The Unified Software Development Process
The unified process, created by J. Rumbaugh, I. Jacobson, and G. Booch
in 1999, is divided into four areas of focus: inception, elaboration,
construction, and transition. The unified process is considered an iterative
process. Each of the specific phases is reviewed in an iterative fashion
followed by the complete process being iterated for the next component in
the system. Each iteration of the process focuses on a specific module in
the complete system based on the ranked business needs. This model
focuses on business concerns rather than technical concerns. The software
requirements specifications are completed throughout all phases, but the
majority of the specifications are developed during the inception and
elaboration phases. The unique factor in the unified process is that it
focuses on what it considers “six fundamental best practices.” These
fundamentals are: develop software iteratively, manage requirements,
develop user component-based architectures, visually model software,
verify software quality, and control changes to software [11]. During
development with the unified process model, security requirements would
be gathered as a step within each iteration of a phase.

During the

inception phase security would be specified as an overview. During the
elaboration phase, security would be specified in software requirements
specifications.

The construction phase would focus on how to code

securely, and in the transition phase physical security measures would be
placed into the system. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the
unified process model.

Figure 3: The Unified Software Development Process [11]
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2.2 IEEE Standard 830
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE, is a nonprofit
professional association that strives to advance technology.

It is

comprised of industry professionals, academic professionals, and students.
IEEE has produced many standards for engineering by using a set of tested
and scrutinized methods.

“Our standards are developed in a unique

environment that builds consensus in an open process based on input from
all interested parties” [7]. IEEE believes that by providing and defining
standards for the technology industry, organizations will have the
following benefits:
“...market growth for new and emerging technologies, reduced
development time and cost, sound engineering practices,
decreased trading costs and lowered trade barriers, increased
product quality and safety, reduced market risks, and protection
against obsolescence” [7].

There are currently three publications of the IEEE Standard 830: Release
1984, Release 1993, and Release 1998. These standards describe what a
high-quality software requirements specifications document should
contain and how it should be organized.

The only main difference

between the three documents is how the information is visually presented
in each release, but the concepts and templates are essentially the same.
IEEE states that all of their standards must be reviewed every five years.

2.2.1 Software Requirements Specifications Qualities
The software requirements specifications should be an unambiguous,
verifiable base for an agreement between the customer and the developer
as to what is to be designed. This understanding should be based on the
following characteristics of good software requirements specifications:
“correct, unambiguous, complete, consistent, ranked for importance and/or
stability, verifiable, modifiable, and traceable” [13]. The main goal of the
document is to reduce the cost – both time and financial – of the
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development process. During the later phases of the project, the software
requirements specifications is used to validate and verify that all
contractual agreements have been achieved by the development team, and
also serves as a reference to individuals or organizations performing
maintenance on the software product after it has been delivered to the
customer [2].
IEEE Standard 830 provides templates for the software requirements
specifications to the industry.

A sample software requirements

specifications template is provided in section 6.1. This template shows
many aspects that are needed to properly specify requirements for a
software project; a description of the sections of the template is provided
in the following sections.
2.2.1.1 SRS: Introduction Section
The introduction section is designed to provide information to the user that
might be helpful while progressing through the software requirements
specifications document. The purpose section is to specify the reason for
the software requirements specifications as well as the target audience.
The scope section provides the names of the software products to be
designed and the main goals and objectives of the system. If there is
anything specific the software product will not accomplish, this is to be
clearly stated here. The definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations section
provides a reference area for the reader to refer to while reading the
document. This can be a bulleted list or in any format, but should explain
any unclear terms or technical aspects that either the customer or the
developer might not understand while reading the software requirements
specifications. The references section is expected to list any referenced
documents during the creation of the software requirements specifications.
The overview section should explain what the rest of the software
requirements sections either mean or entail [13].
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2.2.1.2 SRS: Overall Description Section
The overall description area provides information on how each of the
factors of the system affects the software requirements specifications.
This section is not to include specific requirements; specific requirements
are placed in the specific requirements section of the document. The
product perspective section should describe the system in terms of other
products, either on the market or currently being used in the old
environment – the system being replaced. The product functions section is
to briefly describe the major components of the system being developed.
Graphical representation may be presented in this section to help the
reader understand each function’s relationship to other functions and the
system as a whole.

User characteristics should describe the users’

knowledge base. This should not provide requirements the users will need
to use the system, but provide a better understanding as to why the system
is being designed in a specific manner. The constraints section is to
describe what constraints might be put on the system being designed. For
instance, if the software being designed is to be used on cellular devices;
then, the application will have less memory to operate in comparison to an
application being deployed on a desktop. Assumptions and dependencies
are listed in the software requirements specifications because most
systems do not perform correctly due to developers or users assuming that
the other party has a clear understanding of a requirement which might not
have been acknowledged by the other party.

The items listed in the

assumptions and dependencies area are to explain requirements that might
affect the software requirements specifications [13]. For example:
“…an assumption may be that a specific operating system will
be available on the hardware designated for the software product.
If, in fact, the operating system is not available, the SRS
[software requirements specifications] would then have to
change accordingly” [13].
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The apportioning of requirements section is used to explain certain
features or functionality that might be delayed for future releases or
versions of the software.

2.2.1.3 SRS: Specific Requirements
The specific requirements area is to specify the software requirements in a
clear and technical manner so the developers can complete development to
the needs of the customer. The external interfaces section provides a
detailed description of all inputs into the system and outputs returned by
the system.

This is completed by breaking down all the data

inputs/outputs and describing the details about them.

The functions

section should provide technical details about all of the functions provided
in the software.

This is completed using both textual and graphical

descriptions of the following areas: validity checks on the inputs, exact
sequence of operations, responses to abnormal situations, effects of
parameters, and relationship of outputs to inputs.

The performance

requirements section should provide system performance requirements.
For example, time expectations for specific operations, the number of
terminals to be supported, and the type of information to be handled. The
logical database requirements section provides a description of the
database, if necessary. The features that the section analyzes are: types of
information used by various functions, frequency of use, accessing
capabilities, data entities and their relationships, integrity constraints, and
data retention requirements. The standard compliance section provides
items that constrict the design to specific formats. These typically occur
during reporting of information in the system for audit purposes – a
specific report for a government organization.
attributes

section

defines

the

reliability,

The software system
availability,

maintainability, and portability of the system.

security,

External interface

requirements provide information to help the developers and users of the
system understand how the new software will interact with other entities
in the system’s environment. [13].
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This paper will discuss in more detail suggested methods on improving the
IEEE standard concerning security. The standard places the majority of
security information into the software attributes section and does not
provide a clear understanding to what security requirements mean or how
they should be developed.

2.2.2 SRS: Security Requirements Evolution
Security Requirements in IEEE Standard 830 have not evolved during
each release. In all releases, IEEE Standard 830-1984, IEEE Standard
830-1993, and IEEE Standard 830-1998, the security requirements were
specified under the subsection of attributes in the specific requirements
section.

The security specifications area stated that it should address

factors such as “accidental or malicious access, use, modification,
destruction, or disclosure” [2].

2.3 Legislation and Regulations
New legislation, regulations, and corporate policies affect how
information technology is used to secure sensitive information.
Legislation is currently being developed throughout the federal and state
levels of the United States government to ensure that personal information
is not disclosed without the explicit consent of the United States’
economic consumers.

The forthcoming sections will describe some

examples of such regulatory efforts.

2.3.1 United States Federal Legislation
Information security is gaining momentum throughout the United States.
Federal legislation is pushing the information technology sector to secure
sensitive information. A few examples of these laws follow.
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2.3.1.1 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, also known as
FERPA, protects students’ education records.

Information that is

considered private according to FERPA includes, but is not limited to,
academic performance and financial account information. This federal
regulation does permit directory information to be released to the public
under the guidelines that such information is public knowledge [5].
2.3.1.2 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, also
known as HIPAA, provides regulatory standards on how electronic
medical information is to be handled by health care organizations. This
statute provides protection against many abuses in the health care industry.
It specifically states that if an individual or organization gains
unauthorized access to any unique health care identifier, personal
identifiable medical information, or discloses such information that the
individual or organization is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment [1].
2.3.1.3 Financial Services Modernization Act
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, was designed to protect consumer financial
information.

The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act provides a means for

enforcement agencies to enforce two regulations: the Financial Privacy
Rule and the Safeguards Rule [14]. The Financial Privacy Rule states that
financial institutions must inform consumers of the collection of personal
financial information, with whom it will be shared, and how the financial
information is going to be protected. This rule also provides a means by
which consumers can object to their information being shared with third
parties [6]. The Safeguards Rule clearly states that organizations that
collect financial information must take measures to protect the information
they are provided during transmission and storage [14].

12

2.3.1.4 Public Company Account Reform and Investor Protection Act
The Public Company Account Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, also known as Sarbanes-Oxley, sets forth a few parameters that are
pertinent to software design. One of the parameters requires financial
audit information to be kept securely for a period of five years. Another
parameter states that any mutilation or altering of information is
punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. One other parameter that can
directly affect how software is designed states that all communications,
physical or electronic, must be stored if it pertains to an audit/review or
financial information that would/could be audited [12].

2.3.2 United States State Legislation
There is currently Security Breach Legislation in more than half of the
United States. These legislative laws are not the only state laws that can
affect software engineering, but they provide a clear example how state
law can affect the design of software systems. Figure 4 provides a visual
understanding of the states with current security breach legislation and the
year their legislation went into effect.
The state laws regulating personal information are designed to force
industry to take measures to prevent personal information from being
stolen or disclosed to unauthorized individuals.

The laws state that

personal information is, but not limited to: social security number, driver’s
license, credit card number, debit card number, financial account number,
passwords, personal identification numbers, security codes, access codes,
and et cetera [3]. All of the current legislation specifically states that if the
information disclosed was unencrypted that the individuals of said states
must be notified that their personal information may have been disclosed
without consent [9].
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Figure 4: Security Breach Law Enactments [9]

2.3.3 Corporate Policies and Standards
Role-based access control policies are typically seen in corporate
regulations. Most organizations set a specific type of role for each of its
users. This role based access control policy provides specific credentials
to be met prior to permitting a user access to the digital information
requested. Information that corporate organizations store, manipulate, and
transmit is accepted as needing to be classified and secured.
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2.3.3.1 Information Management Security Policy
One of the first steps to creating an information management security
policy is specifying the organization’s assets. These assets range from
employees to digital information. The next step is defining how to protect
the organization’s assets. A closer look at digital information is needed.
Digital information is typically stored in data centers within an
organization; users and systems that try to access the data must clearly be
authorized to have such access. These roles are defined based on the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability policies with which the digital
information must comply. The purpose for the role based access policies
are simple: if a user changes information that he/she is not authorized to
change, then the integrity and confidentiality of the information is
compromised. If a system cannot retrieve information that is needed, then
the availability is compromised. If proprietary information is disclosed to
persons who are not authorized to have access, then the confidentiality of
the information is compromised. Corporations must establish role-based
access controls for their information to retain all three qualities:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability [4].
2.3.3.2 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
The credit card industry in 2006 released the Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard.

This standard placed many restrictions on

organizations and corporations that accept credit cards as a form of
payment.

If organization or corporations do not comply with said

standard, their status as credit card processor could be revoked and the
corporations could be fined.

Some of the restrictions include the

following: build and maintain a secure network, protect cardholder data,
maintain a vulnerability management program, implement strong access
control measures, regularly monitor and test networks, and maintain an
information security policy [8].
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2.4 Current Research in the Profession
Microsoft and Compuware worked together to perform a study of security
practices in the United States and Europe. On October 9, 2006, they
released the results of their study titled: How Secure is Your Application
Development?

Their claim is that: “security is only as good as the

weakest link” [22]. They analyzed the completed breakdown of a webapplication to show that the weakest link is the development of the
application. Looking at the protection levels of a web-application there
can be five areas that security needs to be in place: desktop layer, transport
layer, access layer, network layer and application layer.
The desktop layer is where the end user is located. He or she decides to
access the web-application. At the desktop layer the end user would be
performing his or her part in the security process by having an anti-virus
program fully operational and up-to-date.

The next layer during the

process of the end user accessing the web-application presents the
transport layer. The transport layer is represented by the World Wide
Web. The security measure at this stage in the process is an encrypted
connection.

During the access layer a firewall verifies that the

communication passing through it to the web-application is an authentic
connection. An intrusion detection system would be deployed to monitor
the network layer. The user has now reached the application layer. This
layer has been developed and placed on the web for viewing. Therefore
the only security measures now in place are the built-in application
protections.
The problem with relying on built in application protection is that most
developers either don’t understand the security requirements or they see
security requirements as a limiting agent on the application [22].
Developers generally see security as a means by which to slow the
application down, or not provide the access that the developer feels the
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application deserves.

Compuware and Microsoft both claim that the

weakest link in this example is the application itself.

“… security

vulnerabilities at the application level are a form of design or coding
defect…” [22].

Compuware and Microsoft have released a series of

security approaches for developers. These include: assess business risk,
develop the right architecture, code securely, test early and often, and
validate security.
Compuware and Microsoft felt that if everyone was deploying anti-virus
programs, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, then the weakest link had
to be the application. They claim that with all these security measures in
place, there should be no security breaches, but security breaches still
occur based on commonly exploited attack mechanisms: SQL injections
and buffer overflows [22]. These vulnerabilities in the software place the
application in danger of being attacked once the information is made
aware to the public.

Compuware and Microsoft called for software

developers to take security measures during the design phase to mitigate
these risks [22].
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2.5 Relevant Standards
There are numerous standards that are currently being referenced by
organizations that use sensitive information. Sections 2.5.1-2.5.3 provides
a description of three standards that can affect the software requirements
specifications. As discussed later in this document, the software engineers
developing the software requirements specifications must understand how
the customer’s organization needs to handle the data for their organization
as well as how to handle the development of the SRS. For example,
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and NIST SP 800-100 both provide asset
classification.

Assets, such as data, are defined in the organizations

information security management policies. These policies also provide
specifics on how the data is to be handled. The software requirements
specifications need to reflect a software design that will conform to the
handling of such data according to the organizations information security
management policies.

2.5.1 ISO/IEC 9001:2000
ISO/IEC 9001 provides requirements for quality management. It provides
development companies an organized guidance to create a quality
management system. The goal of a quality management system is to
provide the developing organization a set of steps to developing a project
and measurable guidelines to ensure that the customer receives a high
quality product [26]. Software engineering companies would use ISO/IEC
9001 to provide a structure for developing software. A specific stage in
this process might include develop software requirements specifications
using IEEE Standard 830.
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ISO/IEC 9001:2000 addresses issues such as: how to control documents,
how to control records, how to perform internal audits, how to control
nonconforming products, how to take corrective actions, and how to take
preventative actions. All six of these categories, addressed by ISO/IEC
9001:2000, provide the quality management controls needed to maintain
the software requirements specifications.

2.5.2 ISO/IEC 27001:2005
Information Security Management Policies are becoming a common
practice.

ISE/IEC 27001:2005 provides a template for developing an

information security management system (ISMS).

Located in the

framework of an ISMS are: risk assessment and treatment, security policy,
organization of information security, asset management, human resources
security, physical and environmental security, communications and
operations management, access control, information system acquisition,
development,

and

maintenance,

information

security

incident

management, business continuity management, and compliance [27]. The
software requirements specifications need to include references to the
information security management policies of an organization. Located in
the ISMS is detailed information about how assets are analyzed and
protected inside the organization.

2.5.3 NIST SP 800-100
The NIST information security management standard contains the
following aspects: information security management governance, system
development life cycle, awareness and training, capital planning and
investment control, interconnecting systems, performance measures,
security planning, information technology contingency planning, risk
management, certification, accreditation, and security awareness, security
services and products acquisition, incident response, and configuration
management. All of these policies, once created within an organization,
provide detailed instructions on certain business aspects are to be
addressed [25]. For example, in the awareness and training policy, a set of
19

specific guidelines will be specified as to how the training of a new system
or security policy will be conducted inside the organization. In the risk
management policy, an organization would specify specific risks that it
feels could harm the organizations wellbeing. An example of such risk
would be the risk of an unauthorized release of sensitive information. It
would provide a classification of the risk and possible ways to mitigate the
issue.

Knowing what an organization believes are risks, during the

development of the software requirements specifications for the
organizations software, is a benefit software engineers will need to exploit.
The design of the new system can ensure that these risks are either
mitigated or eliminated.

3 SECURING SENSITIVE INFORMATION
Software engineers and computer scientists have progressively changed
their focus when creating new software. When software was first being
written it was focused on scientific and mathematical problems that could
be solved more easily by a computer than by hand. Machine code was
very tedious and difficult to write, with respect to today’s programming
languages. The focus during the beginning of computer programming was
ensuring that the program completed the task accurately. Once accuracy
was achieved, programmers began focusing on making their code more
efficient due to insufficient hardware resources, due to cost. When the
cost of hardware became low, programmers focused on developing large
scale systems to make the lives of humans easier by automating tasks that
would generally be tedious to users. Now that computers are so widely
used throughout humans’ lives, a new aspect of computer software has
come into the light. This aspect is security.
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3.1 The Need for Secure Data
On March 29, 2007, The Boston Globe reported that TJX had reported that
45.7 million credit and debit card numbers were stolen during a security
breach [18]. This is the largest security breach publicly recorded. This
security breach has already cost TJX over $5 million, and the cost is
expected to continually rise. With a cost estimated at $90 per record
stolen, the potential expense that TJX will have to spend estimates at
nearly $4.1 billion dollars [19].
On April 7, 2007, NetworkWorld reported that the Chicago Public School
system had issued a bulletin stating that two laptops had been stolen from
their organization. Contained on the two laptops was nearly 40 thousand
current and past employees’ personally identifiable information.

The

information compromised in this case was names and social security
numbers. A $10 thousand dollar reward has been offered for the arrest
and conviction of the felon who stole the information [20]. At the same
$90 per record stolen, the potential expense that the Chicago Public
School system may have to spend to resolve the issue is approximately
$3.6 million dollars [19].
Darwin Professional Underwriters performed a research study based on
news reports and survey groups to provide corporations with a calculator
to estimate the possible cost of a security breach. Darwin’s calculator
estimates approximately $166.20 per record breached.
calculated into the overall cost includes:

The costs

internal investigation,

notification/crisis management, and regulatory/compliance.

Figure 5

provides a graphical representation based on Darwin’s calculator [21].
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COST OF A SECURITY BREACH
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Figure 5: Cost of a Security Breach [21]

3.2 Digital Information and the Internet
Digital information being stored and transmitted throughout the world, via
the Internet, includes items such as: medical information, credit card
numbers, social security numbers, and recently, biometric information. As
computer users become more accustomed to the digital world, more and
more personal information will be stored in databanks of financial
institutions, academic institutions, private organizations, governments, and
corporations. During the creation of the Internet, security was not a high
concern, for the only groups that had access to it were trusted government
and educational entities. When the Internet became public domain and
began to be used for commercial purposes, the need for security began to
rise. The more persons that have access to a resource the less secure it
becomes. Predators, thieves, and other criminals begin to find ways to
exploit the new technology resources to advance their causes.
Computer software is not only a desktop application, which initial
computer users were accustomed, but also a means by which to share
information through large, multiregional corporations and entities, via the
Internet.
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Consumers trust their financial institutions to keep the personal
information provided to them private, but if the institution is sending
information across the Internet, is the information protected? During the
software design process, if the requirements specifications for the software
were to encrypt the data, then yes, but what if the specific security
measures that needed to be put into place were not understood by
developers?

3.3 IEEE Standard 830 Analysis
IEEE Standard 830 provides a template that is suggested to software
engineers and computer scientists for use when developing software. The
standard provides a location in the template to describe the security with
which the system needs to comply. Even this standard has taken the
afterthought approach to security. A generic description of the security
requirements can easily be misinterpreted. Note that the standard does not
insist that development organizations provide reasoning for the security of
the system.
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3.3.1 IEEE Standard 830 Security Analysis
United States’ legislation is currently challenging the information
technology profession to ensure that personal information is protected. By
modifying the IEEE Standard 830 to include a section called security
requirements, software engineers and computer scientists could obtain a
better understanding of what security measures need taken in the software
they are developing.

What should the security requirements section

contain? The security requirements section should begin by specifying
factors that “protect the software from accidental and malicious access,
use, modification, destruction, or disclosure” [13]. Notice that this is
exactly what the IEEE Standard 830 insists is in the general security
section that it provides. Following this description, it should provide a list
of legislation, regulations, policies, or standards that could affect the
corporation if the organization would experience an incident while using
the software. Along with each piece of legislation, regulation, policy, or
standard, a description of the statute or regulatory rule should be
described. This section may need to be completed in conjunction with
legal staff for either the developing company or the customer requesting
the software.

Another addition to the security section includes the

organization’s classification of their digital information and the specific
requirements with which each classification must comply.
The legislation, regulations, policies, or standards should be provided by
the organization requesting the software, for these organizations have a
better understanding as to what regulations by which they have to abide.
Software engineers should work with the requesting organization to ensure
that all the details of these regulatory statutes are understood.
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Another addition to the standard to help developers grasp a better
understanding requires how the digital information should be handled is to
be completed by placing a security section in each function description.
This security section would list the following items: how the digital
information the function is processing is classified inside the organization,
how the information should be handled, and a reference to any regulatory
standards that could affect the processing, storage, or transmission of such
data – in the newly created security section of the software requirements
specifications.
By providing this information to the developers of new software systems,
developers have all the knowledge they need to complete a sound design,
rather than adding patches to fix the problem after the software has been
released.
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3.3.2 Recommended Additions to IEEE Standard 830
Sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2 show the recommended additions the standard
with descriptions of what each section specifies.
3.3.2.1 SRS: Security Requirements Section
3.1. Security Requirements
It should be used to specify compliance regulations and policies as well
as define the organizations data classification.
3.1.1. Data Classifications
This is a suggested addition to the standard.
information

based

on

the

requesting

It would include

organizations

data

classifications based on their information security policies.
3.1.1.1.

Classification Levels

This would define the levels of classifications and what actions
must be performed to protect the data section. This will help
the development team to accurately manage the digital
information in the software.
3.1.2. Compliance Regulations
This is a suggested addition to the standard. This section provides
and overall view of what regulations or policies the software must
conform.
3.1.2.1.

Regulation Name

This would be the actual name of the regulation.
3.1.2.1.1.

Reference to Regulation

This section would provide information for researching the
regulation.
3.1.2.1.2.

Regulation Description

This section would provide a detailed description of the
aspects of the regulation or policy that could affect the
software design.
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3.3.2.2 SRS: Security Section
3.1.1.8. Security
This section will be used to provide information to the
developer about the handling of the data based on above
suggested addition to the standard.
3.1.1.8.1.

Regulatory Statutes

This section states the statute that could affect the design of
the function.
3.1.1.8.2.

Data Classification

This section states the classification of the data being
handled by the function.
3.1.1.8.3.

Data Handling

This section specifies the specific means to manipulate the
data during processing to abide by the regulatory statute.
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3.4 Sample Security Elicitation Questions
There are many different ways to elicit security requirements.

One

possible way, if using the unified modeling language, is by taking the use
case diagrams developed during the specifying of the functional
requirements of the system and changing them into misuse case diagrams.
To do this, the diagrams are used to display what a user would not want to
occur during the scenario being documented. Below is a set of example
security elicitation questions that will help developers gain an
understanding of the current security needs of their customer.
Does your organization have to comply with any specific
regulations or corporate policies?
Would you provide us with a copy of these regulations or
corporate policies?
Do you currently have an information security management
policy?
If so, what data is classified inside your organization?
How is this data classified?
Are there any specific requirements for how the data shall be
handled (for example: storage, transmission, processing, et cetera)?
What security measures do you currently employ in your
organization?
Do you know or have a recommendation for the types of security
that shall be used throughout the design of the new system?
Do you currently own a VeriSign Certificate, or any other digital
certificates?
What business practices need to involve security?
What aspects of the system being designed do you foresee needing
security?
How are you currently implementing user access controls?
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3.5 Sample Requirements Elicitation
For instance: Developers are informed by their customer that they need to
be able to process credit cards in their software. The customer also states
that they need the ability to store the credit card information for future
purchases of their customers. The developer would ask the following set
of questions to correctly specify the functionality of the software: Are
there any specific legislation, regulations or corporate policies pertaining
to how credit card information is handled? The customer would then
reply, yes, our organization has to comply with the Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standard, also known as the PCIDSS. For the purpose of
this example, it is assumed that this is the only regulatory statute with
which the organization needs to comply. The developer would then ask,
assuming that the developer already understands the organization’s digital
information classification and the requirements it must meet, how is the
credit card information classified?

The organization representative

replies, the information is classified as red – the highest level of
classification in the organization. The developer then asks, are there any
specific ways that this information has to be handled? The organization
representative then replies, it must be encrypted at all times possible and
the complete number should never be displayed to any personnel within
our organization.
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3.5.1 Sample Security Requirements
The software requirements specifications security section would appear as
follows:
<<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>>
3.1 Security Requirements:
<<ALL TEMPLATE FIELDS FROM SECTION 6.1>>
0 Data Classifications
0 Red: Highest level of classification. This data should be
encrypted using X standard.
holds

information

This classification

including:

credit

card

information, <<ALL OTHER INFORMATION IN
THIS CLASSIFICATION>>.
<<ALL OTHER DATA CLASSIFICATIONS>>
3.1.2 Compliance Regulations:
3.1.2.1 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard,
PCIDSS
3.1.2.1.1 Reference to Regulation: See reference
1.1.1 in the references section.
3.1.2.1.2 Description: PCIDSS is a regulatory
statute

placed

on

organizations

and

corporations that accept credit cards as a
form of payment.

It states that when

displaying credit card numbers either on
printed receipts or on the organizations user
displays that only one of the following three
items can be displayed: the first four
numbers, the last four numbers, or both.
<<ALL OTHER COMPLIACE REGULATIONS>>
<<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>>
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3.5.2 Sample Function Specification
The software requirements specification for the previously mentioned
example would appear as follows:
<<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>>
3.3.1 FUNCTION X Specification
<<ALL TEMPLATE FIELDS FROM SECTION 6.1 >>
3.3.1.8 Security
3.3.1.8.1 Regulatory Statutes: PCIDSS further defined in
section X.X
3.3.1.8.2 Data Classifications: Credit Card Number – Red
3.3.1.8.3 Data Handling: The credit card number should not
be displayed to anyone in the organization. After
Credit Card number is read into the system encrypt
the information and store it into a masked field in
the database.

Ensure that the hard drive the

information is stored on is encrypted using X
standard.
<<ALL OTHER SPECIFICATIONS FROM SECTION 6.1>>
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3.6 Technique for Specification of Data
ISO/IEC 11179-1 is a standard that is used to specify information about
data (metadata) [23]. This specification of the metadata is to be stored in a
metadata registry (MDR). The purpose of the standard is to specify data
so that it can be shared in a standard way across distributed or large scale
systems. By using ISO/IEC 11179-1, software engineers can ensure that
the data is being represented by a specific set of rules [23].
The data elements are classified by placing them in a conceptual domain.
A conceptual domain is further divided into a set of categories –
representation of the meaning and permissible values [23]. By using the
customers data classification based on their organizations information
security management policies, software developers can specify the
necessary information needed to utilize an MDR. This information serves
as a framework for what they data looks like and should be handled. An
example based on the previously mentioned scenario follows.

3.6.1 Sample Classification of Data
Conceptual Domain Name:

CreditCards

Conceptual Domain Definition:

Has a set of digits between 13 and 16

Conceptual Security Policy:

Only the last 4 digits can be
displayed in the system.

-----------------------------------------------------Value Domain Name (1):

MasterCard

Value Domain Description:

Card prefix must be between 51-55
and have a total of 16 digits

Value Domain Name (2):

Visa

Value Domain Description:

Card prefix must be 4 and have
either 13 or 16 digits
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3.7 IEEE Standard 830 and the Law
Most of the state security breach laws list specifically that organizations
and corporations must inform customers “…whose unencrypted personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person” [17]. If developers are aware of this clause in the
state legislations, they could develop software that would automatically
encrypt information prior to storage or transmission and decrypt it upon
processing.

This would minimize the risk of disclosing personal

information. Taking extra measurers to ensure that the software is more
secure will make the cost of the product more expensive – more
requirements, more elicitation, more coding, and more bandwidth – but it
will save the company from a long and involved legal battle, due to
disclosure of information under a legislative regulation that requires the
information secured.
Section 6.1 shows the aforementioned recommended changes to the
software requirements specifications outline.
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4 CONCLUSION
Securing information in software engineering projects is becoming
increasingly necessary. Many United States federal and state governments
are enacting legislation to ensure that digital information provided to
financial institutions is protected.

Corporations also have to set their own

policies and standards to ensure information that they need to complete
business is secure. An excellent example is the previously mentioned
PCIDSS.
The corporations and governments that are regulating how digital
information is handled are relying on the information technology
professionals, including computer scientists and software engineers, to
ensure that their regulations are upheld and audited. As new software
projects are defined and software requirements specifications are gathered,
more emphasis needs placed on security throughout the design phase,
rather than just at the end or from a very low level of security.
This paper presented a proposed change to the software requirements
specifications outline provided by IEEE Standard 830. This change would
help ensure that security is analyzed in an earlier stage of the software
development lifecycle.

The new template will help the information

technology industry to develop more secure and legally compliant
software.
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5 FUTURE WORK
This document will be provided to the Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards
Board, as a suggested change. After this document is presented to the
board, the board may make a decision to either: create a new standard,
create a revision to the current standard, amend the current standard,
correct any technical issues of the current standard, correct grammatical
errors in the current standard, or do nothing.
IEEE has set a specific set of guidelines that must be followed to invoke a
change to a standard. First, a project authorization request must be filed to
the New Standards Committee (NesCom). Once approved by NesCom a
working group will be developed. The working group is charged with the
task of developing a draft. After the draft is complete, the sponsor of the
working group will ballot the draft standard. If the ballot is successful,
then the draft is sent to the IEEE Review Committee (RevCom). RevCom
will make a recommendation to the IEEE-SA Standards Board. After the
Standards Board has approved the new standard, it enters the manage
phase. The first step of the manage phase is to publish the standard. Once
published, it will be reviewed every five years for relevance [24].
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6 APPENDICES
6.1 APPENDIX A: Software Requirements Specifications
The following is a suggested requirements specifications template. The
modified sections of the IEEE Standard 830-1998 are highlighted [13].
There are many ways to organized section 3 of the template provided in
IEEE Standard 830-1998 and they are located in section 6.2.
1. Introduction
This section provides an overview of the entire SRS
1.1. Purpose
This section specifies the intended audience and provides the purpose of
the SRS
1.2. Scope
Identifies the software products being developed by name and provides a
brief description as to what each of the products will or will not do. This
section also provides the benefits and objectives of the developing
software.
1.3. Definitions, Acronyms, and Abbreviations
This section provides information that is needed to correctly interpret the
SRS.
1.4. References
This section provides a list of all sources used to create the document or
the citations for any documents that are referenced throughout the SRS.
1.5. Overview
Describes what the rest of the SRS contains. Ensure that in this section
a description of how the security information is presented in the SRS is
described.
2. Overall Description
This section describes factors that affect the product or the SRS.
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2.1. Product Perspective
The product perspective relates the developing product to other products.
It also specifies how the system operates inside various constraints.
2.1.1. System Interfaces
This section lists the system interfaces and the functionality of the
software to accomplish the system requirement.
2.1.2. User Interfaces
This describes both the logical characteristics of each interface to
the user and the aspects of optimizing the interface with the person
who will be using the system.
2.1.3. Hardware Interfaces
This will provide protocols and supported devices for the developing
system. It also provides the configuration characteristics between
the software and hardware.
2.1.4. Software Interfaces
This provides information on how the developing software will
connect to other software products necessary.

Items needed to

specify a software connection are: name, mnemonic, specification
number, version number, and source. A brief discussion should be
provided as to the reasoning for the connection to the other software
product.
2.1.5. Communications Interfaces
This provides information on the various communication protocols
the developing software will interface.
2.1.6. Memory
This specifies the limits on primary and secondary memory.
2.1.7. Operations
This specifies the normal and special operations required by the
user.
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2.1.8. Site Adaptation Requirements
This provides information on the environment and mission of the site
where the software is being installed.

It would provide special

requirements necessary for the specific location.
2.2. Product Functions
This provides a summary of the major functionality within the system.
Textual and graphical methods to specifying the functionality of the
software is encouraged.
2.3. User Characteristics
This provides a general description of the system users: technical
expertise, education level, language, or experience.
2.4. Constraints
This includes information that would limit the developer’s options. The
following subheadings (Regulatory Policies2.4.1-2.4.11) are some
possible constraints that may need considered.
2.4.1. Regulatory Policies
This describes corporate regulations that would limit the
developer’s options.
2.4.2. Hardware Limitations
This provides descriptions of any hardware limitations.
2.4.3. Interfaces to Other Applications
This describes interfaces to commercial off the shelf systems as well
as other previously developed systems.
2.4.4. Parallel Operations
This describes any required parallel operations the system may need
to perform.
2.4.5. Audit Functions
This describes any required audit or monitoring function necessary.
2.4.6. Control Functions
This describes any specific control functions that could limit the
developer’s options.
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2.4.7. Higher-order Language Requirements
This describes specific language constraints due to the language of
the system.
2.4.8. Signal Handshake Protocols
For example: ACK-NACK or XON-XOFF.
2.4.9. Reliability Requirements
This describes any specific reliability requirements.
2.4.10. Criticality of the Applications
This describes the criticality of the system being developed.
2.4.11. Safety and Security Considerations
This provides an overview of any known safety or security issues that
would need to be known during the development phase.
2.5. Assumptions and Dependencies
This provides a list of factors that affect the requirements stated in the
SRS. These are not design constraints but any changes to these items
would inflict a necessary change to the SRS.
2.6. Apportioning of Requirements
This section identifies requirements that might be delayed for future
versions or releases.
3. Specific Requirements
This section is to define the specific technical details of the system so that
designers can develop the product and testers can test the product.
3.1. Security Requirements
It should be used to specify compliance regulations and policies as well
as define the organizations data classification. This section provides
overall security requirements for the system. Sections 3.1.3-0 are some
recommended evaluated areas, there are many others that could be
listed in this section.
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3.1.1. Data Classifications
This is a suggested addition to the standard. It would include
information

based

on

the

requesting

organizations

data

classifications based on their information security policies.
3.1.1.1.

Classification Levels

This would define the levels of classifications and what
actions must be performed to protect the data section. This
will help the development team to accurately manage the
digital information in the software.
3.1.2. Compliance Regulations
This is a suggested addition to the standard. This section provides
and overall view of what regulations or policies the software must
conform.
3.1.2.1.

Regulation Name

This would be the actual name of the regulation.
3.1.2.1.1.

Reference to Regulation

This section would provide information for researching
the regulation.
3.1.2.1.2.

Regulation Description

This section would provide a detailed description of the
aspects of the regulation or policy that could affect the
software design.
3.1.3. Utilize Certain Cryptographical Techniques
This section would provide the specific technique or encryption
standard to be utilized during development.
3.1.4. Keep Specific Log or History Data Sets
This section would specify what information needs log and the
length of the logs (space or time).
3.1.5. Assign Certain Functions to Different Modules
This section would separate the functions into groups based on
security level or access level.
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3.1.6. Restrict Communications between some Areas of the Program
This section would state where communication paths should be
restricted.
3.1.7. Check Data Integrity for Critical Values
This would specify algorithm to be used to compute checksums and
what aspects need checksums.
3.2. External Interfaces
This section provides a detailed description of all inputs into and outputs
from the system. Section 3.2.1 provides a breakdown as to specifying the
data inputs/outputs.
3.2.1. Name of Item
This contains the name of the input/output.
3.2.1.1.

Description of Purpose

This section would describe why the input/output is needed.
3.2.1.2.

Source of Input or Destination of Output

This section would state where the input is coming or where the
output is going.
3.2.1.3.

Valid Range, Accuracy, and/or Tolerance

This section would set threshold values of the input/output.
3.2.1.4.

Units of Measure

This would specify what units the input/output is in.
3.2.1.5.

Timing

This would set threshold value for the length of time to receive
the input or provide the output.
3.2.1.6.

Relationships to other inputs/outputs

This would describe how it interacts with other inputs/outputs.
3.2.1.7.

Screen Formats/Organization

This section is to describe how the screen should be organized.
3.2.1.8.

Window Formats/Organization

This section is to describe how the window should be organized.
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3.2.1.9.

Data Formats

This section defines the format or type of the input.
3.2.1.10. Command Formats
This section defines how the information is received/provided.
3.2.1.11. End Messages
This section defines the final state or message after processing
the data.
3.3. Functions
This section is used to specify the functions in the software product.
3.3.1. Function Name
This section specifically states the function name as it would appear
in the code.
3.3.1.1.

Validity Checks on the Inputs

This section states what checks shall be performed on all inputs
into the function.
3.3.1.2.

Exact Sequence of Operations

This section defines the steps of the function.
3.3.1.3.

Responses to Abnormal Situations

This section defines how the system should handle abnormal
conditions. Sections 3.3.1.3.1-3.3.1.3.3 are some recommended
conditions to evaluate; there are many others that could be
added to this section.
3.3.1.3.1.

Overflow

This section states how the system should handle an overflow
issue.
3.3.1.3.2.
This

Communication Facilities
section

states

how

communication faults.
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the

system

should

handle

3.3.1.3.3.

Error Handling and Recovery

This section describes specific error conditions and how the
system should recover. These will be specific to each system.
3.3.1.4.

Effect of Parameters

This section should specify what each parameter’s purpose is in
the function.
3.3.1.5.

Relationship of Outputs to Inputs

This section is used to show how the information is converted
from an input to an output.
3.3.1.6.

Input/output Sequences

Provides the sequences by which to receive or produce an
input/output.
3.3.1.7.

Formulas for Input to Output conversion

This section provides specific formulas for converting the input
to an output.
3.3.1.8.

Security

This section will be used to provide information to the
developer about the handling of the data based on above
suggested addition to the standard.
3.3.1.8.1.

Regulatory Statutes

This section states the statute that could affect the design
of the function.
3.3.1.8.2.

Data Classification

This section states the classification of the data being
handled by the function.
3.3.1.8.3.

Data Handling

This section specifies the specific means to manipulate the
data during processing to abide by the regulatory statute.

43

3.4. Performance Requirements
This section is used to provide performance requirements to the
developer during the coding phase. It provides numerical requirements
placed on the software or on human interaction with the software as a
whole.
3.4.1. Static Numerical Requirements
These are values that are set that should not change.
3.4.1.1.

Number of Terminals to be Supported

This section provides the number of terminals that the software
will operate on.
3.4.1.2.

Number of Simultaneous Users to be Supported

This section provides the number of users the system should be
able to support.
3.4.1.3.

Amount and Type of Information to be Handled

This section provides information on the amount of information
and the type of information that the system will be processing.
3.4.2. Dynamic Numerical Requirements
These are values that are based on threshold values or a function of
time.
3.4.2.1.

Number of Transactions to be Processed in a Given Time

Period
This provides the number of transaction to be processed and the
time they have to be processed in.
3.5. Logical Database Requirements
This section provides the requirements of anything to be placed or access
a database. Sections 3.5.1-3.5.6 are some suggested areas to consider
when specifying database requirements.
3.5.1. Types of Information used by Various Functions
This section specifies the types of data being used.
3.5.2. Frequency of Use
This specifies how frequently the database will be used.
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3.5.3. Accessing Capabilities
This specifies how the functions will access the database.
3.5.4. Data Entities and their Relationships
This specifies what entities are located in the database and how they
are related to each other.
3.5.5. Integrity Constraints
This sets the requirements on how the database verifies that the
information is correct.
3.5.6. Data Retention Requirements
This specifies how long the data is to be kept.
3.6. Standards Compliance
This section specifies the developer’s standards for developing the
software. This is specified to ensure consistency.
3.6.1. Report Format
This specifies how the developers will provide reports to the
customers and what is to be located in them.
3.6.2. Data Naming
This section specifies the standard by which information is named in
the source code.
3.6.3. Accounting Procedures
This section specifies how functions will call each other.
3.6.4. Audit Tracing
This specifies how to trace processes that have occurred in the
system.
3.7. Software System Attributes
These are requirements that have not been elsewhere documented that the
system must conform. Sections 3.7.1-3.7.5 provides a list of suggested
areas to evaluate. There are many other evaluation methods that could
be listed in this section.
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3.7.1. Reliability
This section specifies how reliable the software must be at the time of
delivery.
3.7.2. Availability
Specifies when the system should be available.

It can analyze

checkpoints, recoveries, and restarts.
3.7.3. Security
This section provides overall security requirements for the system.
Sections 0-3.7.3.5 are some recommended evaluated areas, there
are many others that could be listed in this section.
3.7.3.1.

Utilize Certain Cryptographical Techniques

This section would provide the specific technique or
encryption standard to be utilized during development.
3.7.3.2.

Keep Specific Log or History Data Sets

This section would specify what information needs log and the
length of the logs (space or time).
3.7.3.3.

Assign Certain Functions to Different Modules

This section would separate the functions into groups based
on security level or access level.
3.7.3.4.

Restrict Communications between some Areas of the

Program
This section would state where communication paths should
be restricted.
3.7.3.5.

Check Data Integrity for Critical Values

This would specify algorithm to be used to compute
checksums and what aspects need checksums.
3.7.4. Maintainability
This specifies requirements that relate to the ease of maintenance.
There may be some requirement for certain modularity, interfaces,
complexity, et cetera.
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3.7.5. Portability
This section defines how portable the system must or should be.
3.7.5.1.

Percentage of Components with Host-dependent Code

This is a threshold percentage based on total components.
3.7.5.2.

Percentage of code that is host dependent

This is a threshold value based on all of the system code.
3.7.5.3.

Use of a Proven Portable Language

This section specifies the use of a particular language that the
code is to be written in.
3.7.5.4.

Use of a Particular Compiler or Language Subset

This section specifies the use of a particular compiler for the
code.
3.7.5.5.

Use of a Particular Operating System

This section specifies what operating systems the software
should be able to operate on.
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6.2 APPENDIX B: SRS Section 3 Templates
All of the following templates have been modified based on the templates
located in IEEE Standard 830-1998 [13].

6.2.1 Organized by Mode [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. External Interface Requirements
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.2.1. Hardware Interfaces
3.3.1. Software Interfaces
3.4.1. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. Functional Requirements
3.3.1. Mode 1
3.3.1.1. Functional Requirement 1.1
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.x. Security
3.3.1.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.1.n. Functional Requirement 1.n
.
.
.
3.3.1.n.x. Security
3.3.1.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.n.x.3. Data Handling
3.3.2. Mode 2
.
.
.
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3.3.m. Mode m
3.3.m.1. Functional Requirement m.1
.
.
.
3.3.m.1.x. Security
3.3.m.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.m.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.m.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.m.n. Functional Requirement m.n
.
.
.
3.3.m.n.x. Security
3.3.m.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.m.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.m.n.x.3. Data Handling
3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements
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6.2.2 Organized by Mode: Version 2 [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. Functional Requirements
3.1.1. Mode 1
3.1.1.1. External Interfaces
3.1.1.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.1.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.1.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.1.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.1.1.2. Security Requirements
3.1.1.2.1. Data Classifications
3.1.1.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.1.1.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.1.1.2.2.2. Regulation Name
3.1.1.2.2.2.1. Reference to Regulation
3.1.1.2.2.2.2. Regulation Description
3.1.1.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.1.1.3 Functional Requirements
3.1.1.3.1. Functional Requirement 1
.
.
.
3.1.1.3.1.x. Security
3.1.1.3.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.1.1.3.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.1.1.3.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.1.1.3.n. Functional Requirement n
.
.
.
3.1.1.3.1.x. Security
3.1.1.3.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.1.1.3.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.1.1.3.1.x.3. Data Handling
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3.1.1.4 Performance
3.1.2. Mode 2
.
.
.
3.1.m. Mode m
3.2 Design Constraints
3.3 Software System Attributes
3.4 Other Requirements

51

6.2.3 Organized by User Class [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. External Interface Requirements
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. Functional Requirements
3.3.1. User Class 1
3.3.1.1. Functional Requirement 1.1
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.x. Security
3.3.1.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.1.n Functional Requirement 1.n
.
.
.
3.3.1.n.x. Security
3.3.1.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.n.x.3. Data Handling
3.3.2. User Class 2
.
.
.
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3.3.m. User Class m
3.3.m.1. Functional Requirement m.1
.
.
.
3.3.m.1.x. Security
3.3.m.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.m.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.m.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.m.n. Functional Requirement m.n
.
.
.
3.3.m.n.x. Security
3.3.m.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.m.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.m.n.x.3. Data Handling
3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements
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6.2.4 Organized by Object [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. External Interface Requirements
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. Classes/Objects
3.3.1. Class/Object 1
3.3.1.1. Attributes (direct or inherited)
3.3.1.1.1. Attribute 1
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.1.x. Data Classification
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.n. Attribute n
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.n.x. Data Classification
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3.3.1.2. Functions (services, methods, direct or inherieted)
3.3.1.2.1. Functional Requirement 1.1
.
.
.
3.3.1.2.1.x. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.1.2.m. Functional Requirement 1.m
.
.
.
3.3.1.2.m.x. Data Handling
3.3.1.3. Messages (communications received or sent)
.
.
.
3.3.1.3.x. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.2. Class/Object p
.
.
.
3.3.p. Class/Object p
3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements
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6.2.5 Organized by Feature [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. External Interface Requirements
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. System Features
3.3.1. System Feature 1
3.3.1.1. Introduction/Purpose of feature
3.3.1.2. Stimulus/Response sequence
3.3.1.3. Associated Functional Requirements
3.3.1.3.1. Functional Requirement 1
.
.
.
3.3.1.3.1.x. Security
3.3.1.3.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.3.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.3.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.1.3.n. Functional Requirement n
.
.
.
3.3.1.3.n.x. Security
3.3.1.3.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.3.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.3.n.x.3. Data Handling
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3.3.2. System Feature 2
.
.
.
3.3.m. System Feature m
.
.
.
3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements
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6.2.6 Organized by Stimulus [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1 External Interfaces
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. Functional Requirements
3.3.1. Stimulus 1
3.3.1.1. Functional Requirement 1.1
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.x. Security
3.3.1.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.1.n. Functional Requirement 1.n
.
.
.
3.3.1.n.x. Security
3.3.1.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.n.x.3. Data Handling
3.3.2. Stimulus 2
.
.
.
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3.3.m. Stimulus m
3.3.m.1. Functional Requirement m.1
.
.
.
3.3.m.1.x. Security
3.3.m.1.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.m.1.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.m.1.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
3.3.m.n. Functional Requirement m.n
.
.
.
3.3.m.n.x. Security
3.3.m.n.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.m.n.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.m.n.x.3. Data Handling
3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements
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6.2.7 Organized by Functional Hierarchy [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. External Interface Requirements
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. Functional Requirements
3.3.1. Information Flows
3.3.1.1. Data Flow Diagram 1
3.3.1.1.1. Data Entities
3.3.1.1.2. Pertinent Processes
3.3.1.1.3. Topology
3.3.1.2. Data Flow Diagram 2
.
.
.
3.3.1.n. Data Flow Diagram n
3.2.1.n.1. Data Entities
3.2.1.n.2. Pertinent Processes
3.2.1.n.3. Topology
3.3.2. Process Descriptions
3.3.2.1. Process 1
3.3.2.1.1. Input Data Entities
3.3.2.1.2. Algorithm or Formula of Process
3.3.2.1.2.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.2.1.2.2. Data Handling
3.3.2.1.3. Affected Data Entities
3.3.2.2. Process 2
3.3.2.2.1. Input Data Entities
3.3.2.2.2. Algorithm or Formula of Process
3.3.2.2.2.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.2.2.2.2. Data Handling
3.3.2.2.3. Affected Data Entities
.
.
.
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3.3.2.m. Process m
3.3.2.m.1. Input Data Entities
3.3.2.m.2. Algorithm or Formula of Process
3.3.2.m.2.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.2.m.2.2. Data Handling
3.3.2.m.3. Affected Data Entities
3.3.3. Data Construct Specifications
3.3.3.1. Construct 1
3.3.3.1.1. Record Type
3.3.3.1.2. Constituent Fields
3.3.3.2. Construct 2
3.3.3.2.1. Record Type
3.3.3.2.2. Constituent Fields
.
.
.
3.3.3.p. Construct p
3.3.3.p.1. Record Type
3.3.3.p.2. Constituent Fields
3.3.4. Data Dictionary
3.3.4.1. Data Element 1
3.3.4.1.1. Name
3.3.4.1.2. Representation
3.3.4.1.3. Units/Format
3.3.4.1.4. Precision/Accuracy
3.3.4.1.5. Range
3.3.4.1.6. Data Classification
3.3.4.2. Data Element 2
3.3.4.2.1. Name
3.3.4.2.2. Representation
3.3.4.2.3. Units/Format
3.3.4.2.4. Precision/Accuracy
3.3.4.2.5. Range
3.3.4.2.6. Data Classification
.
.
.
3.3.4.q. Data Element q
3.3.4.q.1. Name
3.3.4.q.2. Representation
3.3.4.q.3. Units/Format
3.3.4.q.4. Precision/Accuracy
3.3.4.q.5. Range
3.3.4.q.6. Data Classification
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3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements
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6.2.8 Showing Multiple Organizations [13]
3. Specific Requirements
3.1. External Interfaces
3.1.1. User Interfaces
3.1.2. Hardware Interfaces
3.1.3. Software Interfaces
3.1.4. Communications Interfaces
3.2. Security Requirements
3.2.1. Data Classifications
3.2.1.1. Classification Levels
3.2.2. Compliance Regulations
3.2.2.1. Regulation Name
3.2.2.1.1. Reference to Regulation
3.2.2.1.2. Regulation Description
3.2.3. Other Security Requirements
3.3. Functional Requirements
3.3.1. User Class 1
3.3.1.1. Feature 1.1
3.3.1.1.1. Introduction/Purpose of Feature
3.3.1.1.2. Stimulus/Response Sequence
3.3.1.1.3. Associated Functional Requirements
.
.
.
3.3.1.1.3.x. Security
3.3.1.1.3.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.1.3.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.1.3.x.3. Data Handling
3.3.1.2. Feature 1.2
3.3.1.2.1. Introduction/Purpose of Feature
3.3.1.2.2. Stimulus/Response Sequence
3.3.1.2.3. Associated Functional Requirements
.
.
.
3.3.1.2.3.x. Security
3.3.1.2.3.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.2.3.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.2.3.x.3. Data Handling
.
.
.
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3.3.1.m. Feature 1.m
3.3.1.m.1. Introduction/Purpose of Feature
3.3.1.m.2. Stimulus/Response Sequence
3.3.1.m.3. Associated Functional Requirements
.
.
.
3.3.1.m.3.x. Security
3.3.1.m.3.x.1. Regulatory Statutes
3.3.1.m.3.x.2. Data Classification
3.3.1.m.3.x.3. Data Handling
3.3.2. User Class 2
.
.
.
3.3.n. User Class n
.
.
.
3.4. Performance Requirements
3.5. Design Constraints
3.6. Software System Attributes
3.7. Other Requirements

64

7 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1]

104th Congress. 1996. Public Law 104-191. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. [Online] August 21, 1996.
[Cited: March 18, 2007.] http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl104191.htm.

[2]

American National Standard Institute. 1984. IEEE Guide to Software
Requirements Specifications. New York, NY : The Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1984. ANSI/IEEE Std. 830-1984.

[3]

Apani Networks. 2006. The California Security Breach Information Act
(SB1386) and Its Impact on IT Security. Apani Knowledge Center.
[Online]
July
19,
2006.
[Cited:
March
17,
2007.]
http://www.apani.com/pdf/Apani-sb1386.pdf.

[4]

Barkley, John. 1995. Aspects of Security Policies. Role Based Access
Control. [Online] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
January
9,
1995.
[Cited:
March
18,
2007.]
http://hissa.ncsl.nist.gov/rbac/paper/node2.html.

[5]

Family Policy Compliance Office. 2005. Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA). U. S. Department of Education: Promoting
educational excellence for all Americans. [Online] February 17, 2005.
[Cited:
MArch
18,
2007.]
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferpa/index.html.

[6]

Federal Trade Commission. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: The
Financial Privacy Rule. Privacy Initiatives: Financial Privacy. [Online]
Federal
Trade
Commission.
[Cited:
March
17,
2007.]
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/financial_rule.html.

[7]

Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers. 2007. IEEE Standards.
IEEE The world's leading professional association for the advancement
of technology. [Online] IEEE, 2007. [Cited: March 17, 2007.]
http://www.ieee.org/web/standards/home/index.html.

[8]

MasterCard International Inc. and Visa U.S.A. Inc. 2006. Payment Card
Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard. Welcome to PCI Security
Standards Council. [Online] September 2006. [Cited: March 19, 2007.]
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_v1-1.pdf.

[9]

Molsen. 2006. Chart of State Privacy and Data Security Rules. Kauffman
eVenturing. [Online] August 17, 2006. [Cited: March 17, 2007.]
http://eventuring.org/eShip/appmanager/eVenturing/ShowDoc/eShipWeb
CacheRepository/Documents/State_Privacy_and_Rules.xls.

[10]

Software Engineering Techniques. NATO Science Committee. 1969.
[ed.] J. N. Buxton and B. Randell. Rome, Italy : NATO Science
Committee, 1969.

65

[11]

Sommerville, Ian. 2007. Software Engineering. 8th Edition. Harlow :
Pearson Education Limited, 2007. ISBN: 0-321-31379-8.

[12]

Spurzem, Bob. 2006. What is Sarbanes-Oxley Act? CIO Definitions.
[Online] TechTarget, November 21, 2006. [Cited: March 18, 2007.]
http://searchcio.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid19_gci920030,00.html.

[13]

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 1998. IEEE
Standard 830-1998. New York, NY : The Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1998. ISBN: 0-7381-0332-2.

[14]

US Federal Trade Commission. The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act. Privacy
Initiatives: Financial Privacy. [Online] Federal Trade Commission.
[Cited:
March
17,
2007.]
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/glbact.html.

[15]

Network Effects and Software Development - Implications for
Security. Raman, Jari. 2004. s.l. : IEEE, 2004. 37th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences. ISBN: 0-7695-20561/04.

[16]

Software Engineering for Security: A Roadmap. Devanbu,
Premkumar T. and Stubblebine, Stuart. 2000. Limerick, Ireland :
ACM Press, 2000. International Conference on Software
Engineering. pp. 227-239. ISBN: 1-58113-253-0.

[17]

California State Senate. 2002. SB 1386 Senate Bill CHARTERED. California State Senate. [Online] September 26,
2002. [Cited: March 10, 2007.] http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/0102/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html.

[18]

Abelson, Jenn. 2007. Breach of data at TJX is called the biggest
ever. boston.com: Business. [Online] The Boston Globe, March 29,
2007.
[Cited:
April
12,
2007.]
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/03/29/breach
_of_data_at_tjx_is_called_the_biggest_ever/.

[19]

McGregor, J. Patrick. 2007. How the TJX breach may change
security awareness. SC Magazine for IT Security Professional.
[Online] SC Magazine Australia, April 12, 2007. [Cited: April 12,
2007.] http://www.securecomputing.net.au/feature/3417,how-thetjx-breach-may-change-security-awareness.aspx.

[20]

Doggs, Alpha. 2007. Chicago Public Schools latest to fess up to
data breach. Community: Security. [Online] NetworkWorld, April
7,
2007.
[Cited:
April
12,
2007.]
http://www.networkworld.com/community/?q=node/13573.

66

[21]

Darwin Professional Underwriters. 2007. Tech//404 Data Loss
Cost Calculator . Tech//404 by Darwin. [Online] Darwin
Professional Underwriters, 2007. [Cited: April 12, 2007.]
http://www.tech-404.com/calculator.html.

[22]

Compuware and Microsoft. 2006. Application Security: How Does
your Development Stack Up? Webcasts On-Demand. [Online]
October
9,
2006.
[Cited:
April
12,
2007.]
http://www.compuware.com/events/forms/app_security.asp?cid=7
01000000004mADAAY&focus=SecurityChecker&productfocus=
SecurityChecker&source=Web++Webinar&offering=DevPartner&productfamily=DevPartner&des
c=Placement+of+sponsored+webcast+with+Computerworld+onto
+Compuware.com.+Speakers%3a+Michael+Leworthy+(Visual+St
udio)+%26+Ken+Cowan+(CPWR)&trk=200610-1751.

[23]

ISO/IEC. 2004. ISO/IEC 11179, Information Technology -Metadata Registries (MDR). ISO/IEC JTC1 SC32 WG2
Development/Maintenance. [Online] September 15, 2004. [Cited:
April 16, 2007.] http://metadata-standards.org/11179/#11179-5.
ISO/IEC 11179-1:2004(E).

[24]

IEEE. 2007. IEEE Standards Development Online. IEEE
Standards Association. [Online] IEEE, April 4, 2007. [Cited: April
15,
2007.]
http://standards.ieee.org/resources/development/forms/index.html.

[25]

National Institute of Standards and Technology. 2006. Information
Security Management: A Guide for Managers. NIST Special
Publications. [Online] NIST, October 2006. [Cited: April 23,
2007.] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-100/SP800100-Mar07-2007.pdf.

[26]

Praxiom Research Group Limited. 2006. ISO 9001 2000. [Online]
Praxiom, December 12, 2006. [Cited: April 22, 2007.]
http://www.praxiom.com/iso-9001-b.htm.

[27]

Praxiom Research Group Limited. 2007. ISO IEC 27001 2005 .
[Online] April 7, 2007. [Cited: April 23, 2007.]
http://www.praxiom.com/iso-27001.htm.

67

